In 1960 a dramatic event occurred which was to paralyze for a time the entire Soviet missile community and even the political leadership. It was the missile launch site disaster which cost the lives of Marshall Metrofan I. Nedelin and 200 Soviet missile experts. The involved missile exploded just before military tests were to begin. Blame for the explosion directly falls on the shoulders of Marshall Nedelin, who, out of anger and impatience, ordered the improper replacement of some faulty equipment, which resulted in the accident. The author of this monograph was a member of the Soviet aerospace community. His account of this accident is of particular interest.
Despite the Nedelin disaster, the Soviet domination in space was not seriously threatened until the US landing on the moon in 1969. This feat the Soviets have not been able to match. Officially, the Soviets deny that they ever made this effort but it is generally recognized that this failure cost the job of Academician Vasily Mishin, who succeeded Korolev. There can be no question: they tried and failed.
There have been other failures, and even though no major loss of life occurred, some had greater technical significance. For example the oscillation problem discussed in Chapter Eight caused the 1966 explosion of a Soviet ICBM. The repercussions from this explosion shocked the Soviet leadership, and sent them scrambling for a solution. For a while the Soviet missile community was not only paralyzed but made vulnerable by this accident.
On the whole, frustrations encountered by the engineers in the development of Soviet liquid rocket engines were similar to those encountered by US engineers: sticky valves and combustion instability, to name two. They also encountered the same bureaucratic pressures to meet fixed launch dates determined by political realities. For example, Sergei Korolev was under intense pressure to launch the first Sputnik in 1957. To worsen matters, it was preceded by six failed launches. Khrushchev was so angry, that had the seventh attempt failed, the design bureau would have been closed and Korolev's career would have ended. This marked the beginning of the Soviet lead in the space race.
But the Soviet presence in space was and remains awesome. The author of this monograph was a witness to this program, and hopes that this study will allow the Western reader to trace Soviet developments in a technical field in which they had — at least for a time — unquestioned worldwide leadership.
This monograph is largely a historical account of early rocket engine developments at GDL, and after WWII at the Glushko Experimental Design Bureau (0KB). The author was associated with the Glushko Design Bureau where he was Chief Designer of the Rocket Engine Reliability Section in 1965.
The author took part in many of the happenings in the Soviet rocket industry during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s that played a key role in the developments of Soviet rocketry. He provides insight into what happened and answers many questions which we, in the United States had only speculated on including the development of Sputnik, the Soviet Lunar program and many of the failures and accidents that were hidden from the West. For example, he provides insight into why the Soviets use clusters of engines on their launch vehicles rather than the one or several large engines that we use for our launch vehicles.
The evolution of the Glushko liquid rocket engines from a basic combustion chamber and steel nozzle to the cluster engine with the "shaped (contoured) nozzle" is illustrated in addition to reasons for the Soviets to take this approach. Glushko preferred the multi-chamber (clustered) engines because they could be easily and economically modified, they were shorter and more reliable during operation. If one chamber failed, the engine was shut down and the remaining engines could operate for a longer time to enable the mission to be successfully completed. The Glushko engines ultimately used propellants similar to those used in the United States; nitrogen tetroxide oxidizers and amine fuels.
Dr. Bolonkin also had experience with the Antonov Aviation 0KB in Kiev from 1958 thru 1960, and various academic institutions. The author has extensive research and design experience within the Soviet aerospace industry and the State Committee on Higher Education (Gosobrassovaniye) (1) under contract with the Soviet aviation, rocket, and aerospace industries.
More important was the author's work at the leading Soviet R&D facility, TsAGI (the Zhukovsky Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute) in Ramenskoe, of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. It was TsAGI that was responsible for carrying out wind tunnel tests of most Soviet rocket vehicles and aircraft.
The reader will be interested to note that Delphic Associates has concurrently prepared another monograph on a related topic, The Production of Soviet Ballistic Missile Engines, by Vladimir Konstantinovsky. This monograph examines in depth engine production at the Metalist Plant in Moscow.
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(1) Gosobrazovaniye was formerly Minvuz, the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Education.
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Soviet missile and space program is a realm in which the Soviets were once the recognized leader. Even today the Soviet space program represents one of the last symbols of success in a country embittered and disillusioned after seventy years of communist rule. The reader should recall the electrifying shock that rocked the US scientific and technical community in 1957 on the announcement that Sputnik was orbiting the globe. The second shock came in 1961 when the youthful Yury Gagarin became the first cosmonaut to circle the earth. Then followed a string of Soviet firsts in space: from the first walk in space to the first woman in space (Valentina Tereshkova).
Russian experimentation in astrodynamics and propulsion, however, extends back to the turn of the century, when Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) developed theories of interplanetary travel, rocketry, and aerodynamics. Tsiolkovsky's theories paved the way for the giants to come later. In fact, Tsiolkovksy predicted many rocket developments half a century or more before they were realized.
The Soviet missile program began when a handful of enthusiasts formed societies to promote rocket flight. In 1924, three organizations were founded: the Interplanetary Flight Group, the Society for Interplanetary Communications, and the Central Bureau for the Study of the Problems of Rocket Flight. They were all disbanded by the end of the twenties to be replaced in 1928/29 by the first institute devoted to rocket research: the Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) in Moscow. This was operated by what would later be known as the Ministry of Defense. In 1931, two additional centers for rocket research were created, known as Groups for the Study of Jet Propulsion (GIRD). One was established in Moscow (MosGIRD), and one in Leningrad (LenGIRD). The entire structure was reorganized in 1932/33 when the rocket program was placed under the new Jet Propulsion Scientific Research Institute (RNII) in Moscow. The GIRD facilities were moved to Moscow. Meanwhile, a new rocket society was created in 1931 called the Central Committee of the Society for the Support of the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Industries (Osoaviakhim), but unlike the former amateur groups, this council had somewhat more official status and in some measure participated in the activities of RNII.
At RNII, some of the old research activities continued, but now under these four departments or laboratories:
•Gas Dynamics Laboratory - V.P. Glushko (liquid rocket engines)
•Military Solid Rockets - A.G. Kostikov, G.F. Langemak
•Rocket Aircraft - S.P. Korolev
•Rocket Vehicles - M.K. Tikhonravov
To guide the reader through this confusion of organizations, a simplified diagram is presented to graphically demonstrate this evolution of the Soviet rocket program from its beginning to the end of WWII.
At GDL, Frederikh A. Tsander developed the liquid fuel rocket OR-1 (experimental rocket—optynii raket) while Glushko concentrated on the competing ORM-1 (experimental rocket motor), which is generally regarded as the first viable liquid-fuel rocket engine. At MosGIRD, Korolev designed a rocket assisted aircraft, the RP-1, for which Tsander created the improved OR-2 engine. Though successfully flight tested, RP-1 project was terminated in 1933 —coincidentally with Tsander's death. Now the Soviets began to concentrate on solid rockets and liquid missiles. The liquid fuels used as early as 1933 were liquid oxygen, alcohol, and jellied gasoline.
Although the RP-1 project of Korolev had been cancelled, he was rewarded by being given the title of deputy director of the new RNII at the age of 25. At RNII, the emphasis was on high altitude sounding rockets as well as "winged missiles" and ramjets. One more organization entered the missile field before WWII: Design Bureau #7, created in 1935. The number designation meant that it was devoted to strict military rocket projects.
Some milestones in the high altitude rocket development are the ORM-56 which attained a height of 10 km in 1932. The engine, designed by Glushko, developed a thrust of 3,000 N for a payload of 20 kg and an overall launch weight of 400 kg. The engine was fueled by nitric acid and kerosene. To propel the liquids into the combustion chamber, Glushko developed a gas generator (GG series).
The Soviets were best known for their solid propelled rockets; the Katyusha, which was also known as the BM series of rocket launchers. These developments are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
After World War II, missile technology in both the United States and the Soviet Union became national priority targets. These two countries were to remain deadlocked in competition for the next few decades. The race began in the attempt to obtain control of German missile experts. Americans have long believed that they had captured the jewel in the missile crown: Wernher von Braun, who had led the German V-2 effort at Peenemuende.
Peenemuende was destroyed by British bombers but the V-2 program had already been transferred to Nordhausen in the Harz Mountains where massive underground production was initiated. In April 1945, American troops overran Nordhausen and found many assembled V-2s and great quantities of components and subassemblies. When, a few weeks later, the Americans evacuated Nordhausen, they carried away nearly all the V-2 assemblies and equipment as well as about 150 leading German scientists, engineers, and technicians. Within a year, the Germans that were captured as a result of the Allied invasion were transferred to the United States where they reconstructed the V-2 missile and launched the US missile-space program.
The Soviets, at first, attempted to reconstruct the German wartime technological advances inside their zone of occupation. For example, when they entered Nordhausen in the summer of 1945, they created the Institute Raabe where German missile experts launchers. These developments are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
After World War II, missile technology in both the United States and the Soviet Union became national priority targets. These two countries were to remain deadlocked in competition for the next few decades. The race began in the attempt to obtain control of German missile experts. Americans have long believed that they had captured the jewel in the missile crown: Wernher von Braun, who had led the German V-2 effort at Peenemuende.
Peenemuende was destroyed by British bombers but the V-2 program had already been transferred to Nordhausen in the Harz Mountains where massive underground production was initiated. In April 1945, American troops overran Nordhausen and found many assembled V-2s and great quantities of components and subassemblies. When, a few weeks later, the Americans evacuated Nordhausen, they carried away nearly all the V-2 assemblies and equipment as well as about 150 leading German scientists, engineers, and technicians. Within a year, the Germans that were captured as a result of the Allied invasion were transferred to the United States where they reconstructed the V-2 missile and launched the US missile-space program.
The Soviets, at first, attempted to reconstruct the German wartime technological advances inside their zone of occupation. For example, when they entered Nordhausen in the summer of 1945, they created the Institute Raabe where German missile experts in the field. The first Soviet missile was given the designation R-l, and it may be argued that it was very similar to the V-2. Modification and improvement of the R-l led to subsequent models: the R-1A, R-1B, R-1C, R-1D, and R-1E.2 (2). These rockets were developed over the next several years up to about 1955. The first major change away from the V-2 was the development of the R-2 missile (1949) which was also a Korolev creation. It may be assumed that by the late fifties all the German missile scientists had been repatriated. It is assumed that the first Soviet ballistic missile, the R-l, the product of Korolev and N11-88, incorporated the ideas of the Germans in Ostashkov. The Soviet missile-space effort was now on its own.
This monograph will review the highlights of this program. The author will trace the developments in terms of the combustion chambers which are one of the most important — if not the most important — element of the overall missile. Here the author will throw a spotlight on the work of Valentin Glushko who, as stated earlier, was to engines what Korolev was to the overall missile. Glushko developed the engines for the ICBM missile that were to become the strategic arsenal of the Soviets. On their own, the Soviets seemed to have enjoyed a series of successes. The engines developed at the Glushko 0KB in Khimki became the propulsion systems for Korolev's missiles. Thus the RD-100 engine was used in the R-l rocket, the RD-101 was used in the R-2 rocket, the RD-103 was used in the R-5, the RD-107 was used in the Vostok 5 (1963), while the RD-214 and RD-253 engines were used in the Proton rocket and the RD-119 was used to launch the Kosmos series.
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(2) Actually, the first five letters of the Russian alphabet were used to designate these models; A,B,V,G,D.
By the time that the author joined the Glushko 0KB in 1965, the main design problems of liquid-propelled engines (cooling, heat resistance and chemical resistance of materials) were solved by means of injectors, gas generators, centrifugal turbo-pumps and centrifugal atomizers. The remaining problems pertained to overall reliability and stability of the liquid-propelled engines.
In some instances powerful fluid oscillations sometimes arose in the fuel feed lines during operation in the serially produced engines that underwent numerous tests or multiple firings. Often times this would cause bursting of channels, destroying of the engine, and even cause the rocket to explode. A similar problem occurred with the wings of aircraft (flutter) or their tail assemblies (buffeting) in the early 1930s. The problem of oscillations in the feed lines of liquid-propelled rocket engines proved to be much more complex oxidant which often led to an explosion. This particular problem was never solved while the author worked at the design bureau and it is likely that a solution has yet been found.
In short, the oscillations and their random appearance defied explanation. Entire research institutes were summoned to solve this mystery, primarily TsIAM, along with the best scientists, all of whose efforts were to no avail. These scientists did not even succeed in simulating the oscillations under laboratory conditions.
Instead of a genuine solution, oscillation sensors were installed, and when the oscillations were detected, the engine would simply be shut off and the rocket would continue flight with the remaining engines. Large rockets were designed to allow for failure of one or two engines during launch. After each engine failure on the bench or in flight, a scientific board was organized and investigations were initiated.
The oscillation problem was one of the primary reasons why Minobshchemash ceased to develop powerful single-chamber liquid-propellant superengines in the 1960s.
Because the single-chamber engine was now considered unreliable, it was replaced by a multi-chamber variant assembled from serially produced single-chamber engines in 1972. If oscillations arose in any one chamber, it was immediately shut off. A four chamber engine had a thrust loss of 25% as compared to the single-chambered engines, but this approach considerably decreased the number of launch failures.
In the winter of 1965-66 there occurred an event that shook the USSR Supreme Military Command and Central Committee. A standard test of a strategic missile deployed by the Strategic Rocket Forces was being made. Following standard procedure, the missile was removed from its operational silo, the nuclear warhead was replaced with a dummy, and it was transported to a space launch facility for testing (The main administration for strategic missiles supervised).
The military leadership was present at the test and the "research ship" Kamorov was already in position at the expected splashdown site of the dummy warhead. But immediately after the launch command, the missile malfunctioned. The rocket exploded on the launchpad. Earlier there had been accidents with Soviet missiles, but they had usually involved rockets still under development or that were used to launch satellites or space vehicles. This particular accident was unusual since it was an operational missile that had been serially produced in the thousands. The missile had an RD-253 engine.
A commission including representatives of the Nil, 0KB, and plant responsible for the missile engine's development and production was immediately created to investigate the causes of the disaster. It consisted of representatives of the military command the Main Administration for strategic rocket forces of the Ministry of Defense and all organizations involved in developing the missile (Yangel 0KB), its engine (designed by Glushko 0KB), and its instrumentation.
The commission's analysis of telemetric data and of the wreckage found the cause of the accident to be the powerful oscillations described in the previous chapter. These oscillations destroyed the engine and caused the entire missile to explode.
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